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Abstract—We introduce a new measure on secrecy, which
is established based on rate-distortion theory. It is named
security rate, which is the minimum (infimum) of the additional
rate needed to reconstruct the source within target distortion
level with any positive probability for wiretapper. It denotes
the minimum distance in information metric (bits) from what
wiretapper has received to any decrypted reconstruction (where
decryption is defined as reconstruction within target distor-
tion level with some positive possibility). By source coding
theorem, it is equivalent to a distortion-based equivocation
min
p(vn|sn,m):Ed(Sn,V n)≤DE
1
n
I (Sn;V n|M) which can be seen as a
direct extension of equivocation 1
n
H (Sn|M) to lossy decryption
case, given distortion level DE and the received (encrypted)
message M of wiretapper. In this paper, we study it in Shannon
cipher system with lossless communication, where a source is
transmitted from sender to legitimate receiver secretly and loss-
lessly, and also eavesdropped by a wiretapper. We characterize
the admissible region of secret key rate, coding rate of the
source, wiretapper distortion, and security rate (distortion-based
equivocation). Since the security rate equals the distortion-based
equivocation, and the equivocation is a special case of the
distortion-based equivocation (with Hamming distortion measure
and DE = 0), this gives an answer for the meaning of the
maximum equivocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Shannon cipher system depicted in Fig. 1 is first inves-
tigated in [1], where sender A communicates with legitimate
receiver B secretly by exploiting a secret key that is shared by
them. In [1], Shannon regarded this system as perfectly secret
if the source and the eavesdropped message are statistically
independent. For lossless communication case, a necessary and
sufficient condition for perfect secrecy is that the number of
secret key bits per source symbol exceeds the entropy of the
source. When the amount of key is insufficient, it must relax
the requirement of statistical independence and introduce new
measures of secrecy.
One common way of measuring sub-perfect secrecy is
with equivocation, the conditional entropy 1nH (S
n|M) of the
source given the public message. The use of equivocation as a
measure of secrecy was considered in the original work on the
wiretap channel in [2] and [3], and it continues today. From
lossy source coding theorem, the equivocation indeed indicates
the minimum additional rate for wiretapper to reconstruct the
source losslessly on the basis of the received message M ,
when the coding scheme adopted by A and B is stationary.
For lossy decryption, a distortion-based measure has been
proposed by Yamamoto in [4], which is to measure secrecy
by the distortion that an wiretapper incurs in attempting to
reconstruct the source sequence. However, Schieler et al [5]
show that this measure is cheap, since negligible rates of secret
key can force minimum distortion achieved by wiretapper
to the one reconstructed without any information about the
source; meanwhile it is also fragile, since wiretapper can
reconstruct the transmitted message completely if it has a
little knowledge of the source. To strengthen measure of
secrecy, another distortion-based approach [6], [7] is to design
schemes around the assumption that the wiretapper has ability
to conduct list decoding with fixed list size. The induced
distortion is the minimum distortion over the entire list.
This exponent of list size RL is an important indicator to
secrecy performance. From aspect of uncertainty, RL indeed
indicates the minimum additional rate needed to reconstruct
the source within target distortion level with “zero-delay”
decryption constraint, where “zero-delay” follows from that
only single-block codes are allowed for wiretapper, i.e., the
blocklength adopted by wiretapper is restricted to be the same
to that adopted by A and B (in fact, without delay constraint,
the wiretapper would collect multiple blocks to produce a
supperblock reconstruction, which is called superblock cod-
ing). This quantity is somewhat similar to equivocation (i.e.,
1
nH (S
n|M)), which is also to measure the uncertainty of
the wiretapper. However the equivocation is the minimum
additional rate to decrypt for henchman and wiretapper, when
wiretapper could apply arbitrary length supercode; while for
RL, only single-block codes are allowed for wiretapper. In
addition, from aspect of complexity, RL indicates the exponent
of admissible maximum complexity (exponent of admissible
maximum list size over all blocks) needed to reconstruct the
source within target distortion level.
In this paper, we study the Henchman problem with su-
perblock coding, and define security rate as the minimum (in-
fimum) of the additional rate needed to reconstruct the source
within target distortion level with any positive probability
for wiretapper. We aim at characterizing the optimal tradeoff
among secret key rate, coding rate of the source, wiretapper
distortion DE , and security rate. An important difference from
[6] is that we do not constrain the blocklength adopted by
the Henchman and wiretapper; while in [6], the blocklength
adopted by the Henchman and wiretapper is restricted to be
the same to that adopted by A and B. It is worth noting that the
proof in [6] relies on a likelihood encoder by using the soft
covering lemma [8], which is invalid to solve our problem.
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Figure 1: The Shannon cipher system.
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Figure 2: The henchman problem with superblock coding. A
henchman who has access to the l blocks of source sequence,
Snl, and the l blocks of public message, M l, codes them with
rate RH to help wiretapper to produce a reconstruction. The
wiretapper reconstructs a sequence Znl based on the public
message M l and the information MH from the henchman.
Here M l = (M1,M2, · · · ,Ml) denotes a sequence of the
messages M .
This is because if consider the superblock case and let l→∞
before let n → ∞, then the soft covering lemma does
not hold, where l denotes the number of subblocks in each
supperblock, and n denotes the number of symbols in each
subblock (which is also the blocklength of the code adopted
by A and B). Actually, we find a more general approach
to solve our problem which relies on jointly typical coding.
Moreover, our approach is available to prove the results of
[6]. In addition, we also define distortion-based equivocation
as min
p(vn|sn,m):Ed(Sn,V n)≤DE
1
nI (S
n;V n|M), which can be
seen as an extension of equivocation 1nH (S
n|M) to lossy
decryption case. By source coding theorem, in our problem
the security rate is exactly equal to the distortion-based
equivocation. Hence utilizing the result on security rate, we
can easily characterize the admissible region of secret key
rate, coding rate of the source, wiretapper distortion DE
and distortion-based equivocation by replacing security rate
with distortion-based equivocation. It means that maximizing
equivocation is indeed equivalent to maximizing security rate
of lossless decryption. We also extend our results on lossless
communication case to lossy communication case.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider the secrecy communication system shown in Fig.
1. The sender A observes a source sequence Sn that is i.i.d.
according to a distribution PS . Sender A and legitimate
receiver B share a secret key K that is uniformly distributed
in
[
2nRK
]
1 and independent of Sn. Sender A encodes the
1In this paper, the set 1, ...,m is sometimes denoted by [m].
source using the secret key and then sends the coded message
M to legitimate receiver B over a noiseless channel at rate R,
which is also wiretapped by a wiretapper Eve. To make our
problem more clear, we introduce the Henchman problem with
supperblock coding shown in Fig. 2 (the single block coding
version is investigated in [6]).
Henchman problem with supperblock coding
Definition 1. The encoder and decoder of a (n,R,RK) block
code are defined by the following two mappings:
Encoder f : Sn × [2nRK ]→ [2nR]
Decoder g :
[
2nR
]× [2nRK ]→ Sˆn (1)
The wiretapper Eve overhears the encrypted message M
perfectly. A and B want to communicate within certain distor-
tion level by using the secret key and the noiseless channel,
while ensuring that the wiretapper suffers distortion above
a certain threshold with high probability. We say a source
sequence sn is decrypted by wiretapper if and only if the
wiretapper produces a reconstruction of sn, zn, such that
d (sn, zn) ≤ DE (2)
When DE is small enough, and A and B adopt an appropriate
coding scheme, then the wiretapper cannot decrypt the source
only by M . Hence, we can measure security by the minimum
additional bit rate needed for wiretapper to decrypt the source.
In this case, it is equivalent to that there is a rate-limited
helper (i.e., a henchman) who can access all information
about source (source Sn and the encrypted message M ). As
depicted in Fig. 2, by applying an l- length of superblock
code (each subblock with n symbols), the wiretapper receives
nlRH bits of side information from a henchman who has
access to the source sequence Snl and the public message
M l. Since the wiretapper and henchman cooperate, this means
that the wiretapper effectively receives the best possible nlRH
bits of side information about the pair
(
Snl,M l
)
to assist in
producing a reconstruction sequence Znl.
Definition 2. The (l, RH) Henchman code (Hcode) of a
(n,R,RK) block code is a superblock defined by the following
two mappings:
Encoder fH : Snl ×
[
2nlR
]→ [2nlRH ]
Decoder gH :
[
2nlRH
]× [2nlR]→ Znl (3)
The encoder and decoder of Hcode can be stochastic.
For any (n,R,RK) block code, we define security rate to
measure its secrecy.
Definition 3. For an (n,R,RK) block code adopted by A and
B, and a given decryption distortion level DE , Henchman rate
RH of the (n,R,RK) block code is said to be secure if for
∀ > 0, the following inequality holds. In this case, RH is
said to be a secure Henchman rate or security rate.
lim sup
l→∞
max
(l, R′H)Hcodes
R′H ≤ RH − 
P
[
d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE] ≤  (4)
From Definition 3, we have that if the wiretapper receives
any additional message with rate ≤ security rate, then it
cannot reconstruct the source within target distortion level with
probability≥  for any  > 0. Security rate also denotes the
infimum of the additional rate needed to reconstruct the source
within target distortion level with probability≥  for any  > 0
for wiretapper.
To keep the transmission as secret as possible from Eve, A
and B should maximize security rate or minimize decryption
probability in (4).
Definition 4. The tuple (R,RK , RH , DE) is achievable for
distortion measure d if for ∀ > 0, as well as sufficiently
large n, there exists an (n,R′, R′K) code satisfying
R′K ≤ RK +  (5)
R′ ≤ R+  (6)
P
[
Sn 6= Sˆn
]
≤  (7)
RH (DE) ≥ RH −  (8)
Inequality (8) is equivalent to (4).
Definition 5. Given R, RK , and DE , maximum security rate
R∗H (R,RK , DE) is defined as the supremum of all RH such
that (R,RK , RH , DE) is achievable.
The wiretapper and henchman jointly design a code consist-
ing of an encoder mH = fH
(
snl,ml
)
and a decoder znl =
gH
(
mH ,m
l
)
, subject to the constraint |MH | ≤ 2nlRH . We
assume that the henchman and the wiretapper are both aware
of the scheme that Nodes A and B employ, but neither aware of
the secret key. That is to say the fH
(
snl,ml
)
, gH
(
mH ,m
l
)
may be designed based on the (n,R,RK) block code.
Although we assume the excess distortion constraint con-
straint of distortion for wiretapper here, from the proofs of
our results, our results still hold if apply expected distortion
constraint for wiretapper 2.
In addition, it is worth noting that based on the definitions
above, maximum security rate is equivalent to the following
definition.
Definition 6. For a (n,R,RK) block code adopted by A and
B, and for a given decryption distortion level DE , distortion-
based equivocation is defined as:
RDE (DE) = min
p (vn|sn,m) :
Ed (Sn, V n) ≤ DE
1
n
I (Sn;V n|M) (9)
The distortion-based equivocation is exactly a direct exten-
sion of equivocation to lossy decryption case. For maximum
security rate in Definition 5 we restrict the code adopted by
A and B to be stationary (independent of time), hence the
outputs M l must be a stationary process. Then by source
coding theorem, RDE (DE) is the minimum additional rate to
decrypt source with any positive probability for henchman and
2Assume the distortion function is upper bounded.
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Figure 3: The region in Theorem 1 for source PS ∼Bern(1/2)
and distortion measure d(s, z) = 1 {s 6= z}.
wiretapper. Therefore, maximum RDE (DE) is exactly equal
to R∗H (R,RK , DE). This implies that maximum equivocation
is equal to the maximum security rate of lossless decryption.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The following theorem characterizes the admissible region
for lossless communication among the communication rate,
secret key rate, wiretapper distortion, and security rate.
Theorem 1. Given a source distribution PS and distortion
measure d, the tuple (R,RK , RH , DE) is achievable if and
only if it holds that
R ≥ H (S) , (10)
RH ≤ Γ (RK , DE) (11)
where
Γ (RK , DE) , min
(λ,D) : 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
λD ≤ DE
(1− λ)RK + λR(D)
(12)
R (D) denotes rate-distortion function of source S with dis-
tortion measure d (s, sˆ), i.e.,
R (D) = min
p(v|s):Ed(S,V )≤D
I (S;V ) (13)
The function (12) is exactly the rate-distortion tradeoff of
the timesharing between the points (0, RK) and (D,R (D)).
Note that the region of Theorem 1 is different from that in
Theorem 1 of [6], which is the singleblock coding version of
Henchman problem. More precisely, the region of Theorem
1 is the convex hull of that in Theorem 1 of [6] in RH and
DE dimensions. This is because the timesharing is feasible for
superblock coding, but not feasible for singleblock coding. It
also implies that timesharing is one of the optimal strategies
to achieve the optimal RH and DE tradeoff. Fig. 3 illustrates
Theorem 1 for a Bern(1/2) source and Hamming distortion;
the communication rate is assumed to satisfy R ≥ H(S), and
they have no effect on the (RK , RH , DE) tradeoff. In Fig. 3,
for given RK and RH , the distortion region below the surface
is not achievable for wiretapper with probability 1; while the
distortion region above the surface is achievable for wiretapper
with probability 1.
We can readily establish the following corollaries to Theo-
rem 1.
Corollary 1. Given a source distribution PS and distortion
measure d, for all R ≥ H (S),
R∗H (R,RK , DE) = Γ (RK , DE) (14)
From the fact maximum RDE (DE) is equal to
R∗H (R,RK , DE), we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Given R ≥ H (S) and RK , maximum
RDE (DE) equals the R∗H (R,RK , DE), i.e., they satisfy
lim sup
n→∞
max
(n,R′, R′K) codes
R′ ≤ R,R′K ≤ RK
RDE (DE)
=R∗H (R,RK , DE) (15)
=Γ (RK , DE) (16)
In addition, for lossless reconstruction at wiretapper,
observe that lim sup
n→∞
max (n,R′, R′K) codes
R′ ≤ R,R′K ≤ RK
1
nH (S
n|M)
equals lim sup
n→∞
max (n,R′, R′K) codes
R′ ≤ R,R′K ≤ RK
RDE (0) with Ham-
ming distortion measure, hence by Corollary 2 the maximum
equivocation is indeed equal to the maximum security rate.
Corollary 3. Given R ≥ H (S) and RK , maximum equivo-
cation equals the R∗H (R,RK , DE = 0), with Hamming dis-
tortion measure and also equals Γ (RK , DE = 0).
Note that when setting d (s, sˆ) = 1 {s 6= sˆ} in the region of
Corollary 3, corresponds to requiring a lossless reconstruction
at wiretapper, which was Shannon’s original formulation of
the problem in [1]. In this case, we see that the tuple
(R,RK , RH , DE = 0) is achievable if and only if
R ≥ H (S) (17)
lim sup
n→∞
max
(n,R′, R′K) codes
R′ ≤ R,R′K ≤ RK
RDE (0) = min {RK , H (S)}
(18)
This implies the Shannon’s results [1], i.e., the perfect secrecy
(equivocation equals H (S)) is achievable if and only if RK ≥
H (S).
We now prove the achievability and converse parts of
Theorems 1.
IV. CONVERSE OF THEOREM 1
The constraint R ≥ H(S) follows from the lossless source
coding theorem. If RH ≥ RK , then the henchman can send
the index of possible decryptions of M . For any scheme that
Nodes A and B use, Node B can always use the rate-RK key
to identify the correct decryption of M (with probability 1),
hence the number of possible decryptions of M is at most
2nRK . This means that it is possible for the wiretapper to
produce a lossless reconstruction (with probability 1) with
henchman rate RH . On the other hand, if RH ≥ R (DE),
then the henchman and the wiretapper can simply use a point-
to-point rate-distortion code (ignore M altogether) to describe
Sn within distortion DE (with probability 1), no matter what
scheme Nodes A and B use. In addition, by applying time-
sharing, the the henchman and the wiretapper are able to
achieve any distortion-rate pair on or above the convex hull
of (D,min {RK , R (D)}). Hence, to prevent wiretapper from
achieving that, the inequality(11) holds.
V. ACHIEVABILITY OF THEOREM 1
To prove the achievability, we only need to prove that if
(10) and (11) hold, then there exists a code (adopted by A
and B) making (4) hold. It means that the henchman observes
the pair
(
Snl,M l
)
and encodes a message MH , and the
wiretapper observes
(
M l,MH
)
and decodes Znl; their goal is
to minimize the distortion d
(
Snl, Znl
)
. This is just the usual
rate-distortion setting with side information M l available at
both encoder and decoder. We will prove that if the Node A
and B use the following coding scheme to encode and decode
the source sequence, then (4) holds.
Generation of codebooks: First, randomly generate a code-
book CS consisting of 2nR sequences Sn drawn i.i.d. ∼∏n
i=1 PS (si). Then divide all the codewords into bins of size
2nRK . Index bins by jp ∈
[
2n(R−RK)
]
and denote them as
CS (jp). Also index codewords of each bin by js ∈
[
2nRK
]
.
The codebook as well as binning and indexing are known to
everyone, including the adversaries (henchman and wiretap-
per).
Encoding at sender: Sender encode the sequence sn by j =
(jp, js) if there exists an (jp, js) pair such that sn = sn (jp, js)
in codebook CS and sn (jp, js) ∈ T nδ (This is equivalent to find
an (jp, js) pair such that (sn, sn (jp, js)) ∈ T nδ
(
S, Sˆ
)
, where
test channel PSˆ|S (sˆ|s) = 1 {sˆ = s}). If there is more than one
such index, randomly (uniformly) choose one among them. If
there is no such index, randomly choose one index from
[
2nR
]
.
Then the index within that bin, js, is one-time padded with the
key sequence k. Denote the message to m = (jp,ms), where
ms denotes the resulting message by one-time pad operation
on js with k.
Decoding at legitimate receiver: Using the key k, legitimate
receiver achieves (jp, js) from the received m, and then it
reproduces the sequence sn (jp, js).
By the standard proof on lossless source coding using joint
typicality coding, we can readily establish that if R > H (S),
then the legitimate receiver can reconstruct Sn with high prob-
ability. Hence, we only need to prove that based on received
M , with high probability it is impossible for wiretapper to
achieve distortion less than DE , if RH satisfies (11).
Theorem 2. Let τn be any sequence that converges to zero
sub-exponentially fast (i.e., τn = 2−o(n)). If
RH ≤ Γ (RK , DE) (19)
then for ∀ > 0,
lim
n→∞PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM l
max
(l, R′H)Hcodes :
R′H ≤ RH − 
P
[
d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE] > τn] = 0
(20)
where Γ (· ) is defined in (12), and M l = (M1,M2, · · · ,Ml).
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Then by Theorem 2 we can establish the following corollary.
Corollary 4. If RH satisfies (11), then for ∀ > 0,
lim
n→∞ECS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM l
max
(l, R′H)Hcodes :
R′H ≤ RH − 
P
[
d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE] ] = 0 (21)
The Corollary 4 implies (11) of Theorem 1. Hence the proof
is completed.
VI. CAUSAL ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
Here we consider a more general secrecy system, “causal
encryption system”. Consider the secrecy communication sys-
tem in Fig. 1, where the key is delivered at rate RK , and
the sender can not only use the current key but also all
past keys to code the current block. We assume that the
wiretapper has no decryption-delay constraint, hence it can
do decryption after receving all transmitted blocks (assume
total number is L). Besides, since the sender could adopt
such an adaptive encryption scheme (amount of key could be
different for different blocks), we assume the henchman and
the wiretapper could also arrange any l transmitted blocks to
form a superblock.
Let the sender only use the current key, then this kind
of general secrecy system is degenerated into the system
described in Section II. By using the same compression and
encryption scheme in Section V, the sender and the receiver
could achieve the same secrecy performance. Hence for causal
encryption system, the achievablity of Theorem 1 still holds.
In addition, for the first (1− λ)L blocks, the henchman can
use rate-RK henchman code to help the wiretapper produce
a lossless reconstruction (with probability 1), and for the last
λL blocks, the henchman can use rate-R (DE) henchman code
to help the wiretapper produce a reconstruction of Sn within
distortion DE (with probability 1). Hence, the average hench-
man rate is (1− λ)RK+λR (DE), and the average distortion
is λDE . This means that the converse part of Theorem 1 still
holds as well. Hence the achievable (R,RK , RH , DE) for this
case is also given by Theorem 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a new measure on secrecy,
security rate, which is established based on rate-distortion
theory, and denotes the minimum (infimum) of the additional
rate needed to reconstruct the source within target distortion
level with any positive probability for wiretapper. We study it
in Shannon cipher system with lossless communication, and
characterize the admissible region of secret key rate, coding
rate of the source, wiretapper distortion, and security rate
(distortion-based equivocation). The single block version of
henchman problem has been studied in [6] and [7]. In addition,
by applying time-sharing decryption strategy, in the superblock
version, the henchman and the wiretapper are able to achieve
any distortion-rate pair on or above the convex hull of (D,RH)
of the single block version. Moreover, we prove that such
time-sharing decryption strategy is optimal. In addition, since
the security rate equals the distortion-based equivocation,
min
p(vn|sn,m):Ed(Sn,V n)≤DE
1
nI (S
n;V n|M), and the equivoca-
tion is a special case of the distortion-based equivocation (with
Hamming distortion measure and DE = 0), this gives an
answer for the meaning of the maximum equivocation.
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APPENDIX A
PROPERTY OF DISTORTION SET
Proposition 1. (Property of Distortion Set): For any distortion
measure d(sn, zn), if both |S| and |Z| are finite, then the
cardinality of Dn , {d(sn, zn) : sn ∈ Sn, zn ∈ Zn} is at
most polynomial in n.
Proof: Observe that the term d(sn, zn) only depends on
the joint type of (sn, zn), and moreover the number of joint
types is at most (n+ 1)|S||Z| [10], which is polynomial in n.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: We first define four envents
A1 , {Sn ∈ T nδ , Sn ∈ CS} , (22)
A2 ,

max
jp∈
[
2n(R−RK)
] max
zn∈Zn
ηCS ,D (z
n, jp)
≤ 2n([RK−R(D)]++),∀D ∈ Dn
 , (23)
A3 ,
 minjp∈[2n(R−RK)] γCS (jp) ≥ (1− ) 2nRK
 , (24)
A4 ,

max
sn∈T nδ
φCS (s
n) ≤ 2n(R−H(S)+),
min
sn∈T nδ
φCS (s
n) ≥ 2n(R−H(S)−)
 , (25)
where
ηCS ,D (z
n, jp) ,
2nRK∑
js=1
1
{
d (Sn (jp, js) , z
n) ≤ D,Sn (jp, js) ∈ T nδ
}
(26)
Dn , {d(sn, zn) : sn ∈ Sn, zn ∈ Zn} (27)
γCS (jp) ,
2nRK∑
js=1
1 {Sn (jp, js) ∈ T nδ } (28)
φCS (s
n) ,
∑
j∈[2nR]
1 {Sn (j) = sn} (29)
Obviously the events A2,A3,A4 are only about CS , while the
event A1 is about Sn and CS . The δ-typical set is defined
according to the notion of strong typicality, see [11]:
T nδ (S) , {sn ∈ Sn : |Tsn − PS | < δPS}, (30)
where Tsn denotes the empirical distribution of sn (i.e., the
type of sn).
Next we will prove that any codebook CS that makes the
events A2,A3,A4 hold will also make the wiretapper decrypt
the source with vanish probability. First, by method of types,
we can prove the Lemmas 1-3.
Lemma 1. For any  > 0 and small enough δ, PCS
[A2]→ 0,
as n→∞.
Lemma 2. For any  > 0 and small enough δ, PCS
[A3]→ 0,
as n→∞.
Lemma 3. For any  > 0 and small enough δ, PCS
[A4]→ 0,
as n→∞.
The proofs of Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 are given in Appendixes
C, D and E, respectively.
In addition, denote
Qi ,
{
1, if Node A encodes ith subblock successfully
0, otherwise
(31)
Observe that Node A encodes ith subblock successfully, if and
only if A1 happens; otherwise, randomly choose J . Therefore,
P (Qi|CS ,A) =
{
PSn [A1|CS ,A] , if Qi = 1
PSn
[A1|CS ,A] , otherwise (32)
where A , A2A3A4.
Lemma 4. For any δ > 0, if R ≥ H (S) + , then
PSn
[A1|CS ,A]→ 0, as n→∞.
The proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix F.
In the following, we denote n , PSn
[A1|CS ,A]. Observe
that Ql is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables. Define
A5 ,
{
Ql ∈ T lδ (Q)
}
, (33)
then by the property of typicality we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. For any δ > 0, PQl
[A5|CS ,A]→ 0, as l→∞.
We add Ql to the side information at both henchman and
wiretapper. Obviously, this will not decrease the decryption
performance of henchman and wiretapper. Therefore, to prove
Theorem 2, we only need to show
lim
n→∞PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P[d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE ] > τn] = 0
i.e.,
lim
n→∞PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
[
max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P
[
d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE |M lQlCS] |CS] > τn] = 0
where Hcodes denote the henchman codes with side informa-
tion M lQl at both henchman and wiretapper.
First restrict the CS to satisfy A by utilizing Lemmas 1-3.
PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P[d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE ] > τn]
≤PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P[d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE ] > τn|A]+ PCS [A]
≤PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P[d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE ] > τn|A]+ n (34)
where Hl,RH− , {(l, R′H)Hcode : R′H ≤ RH − }.
We also restrict the Ql to satisfy A5 by utilizing Lemma 5.
lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
[
max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P
[
d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE |M lQlACS] |ACS]
≤ lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
[
max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P
[
d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS] |A5ACS]
+ lim sup
l→∞
PQl
[A5|ACS]
= lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
[
max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P
[
d
(
Snl, Znl
) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS] |A5ACS]
We can consider all possible sequences znl given
(CS ,M lQl) as a codebook. Since the wiretapper only receives
RH rate message from the henchman, possible sequences znl
given (CS ,M lQl) produced by it is not more than 2nlRH . Then
a Hcode could be seen as the combination of a codebook (with
size 2nlRH ) of zn sequences and an encoder that is designed
based on that codebook. Hence we can write
max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P[d(Snl, Znl) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS ]
= max
cz(CS ,M lQl)
P
[
min
znl∈cz(CS ,M lQl)
d(Snl, znl) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS
]
,
(35)
where the notation cz(CS ,M lQl) emphasizes that cz is a
function of the random codebook CS and public messages
(CS ,M lQl). Then by using a union bound, we can write the
right-hand side of (35) as
P
[
min
znl∈cz(CS ,M lQl)
d(Snl, znl) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS
]
(a)
≤
∑
znl∈cz(CS ,M lQl)
P
[
d(Snl, znl) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS
]
(36)
≤2nlRH max
znl∈cz(CS ,M lQl)
P
[
d(Snl, znl) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS
]
(37)
≤2nlRH max
znl∈Znl
P
[
d(Snl, znl) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS
]
(38)
(b)
≤2nlRH max
znl∈Znl
P
[ t∑
i=1
d(Sni (Ji), z
n
i ) ≤ lDE |M lQlA5ACS
]
(39)
=2nlRH max
znl∈Znl
P
[ t∑
i=1
d(Sni (Ji), z
n
i ) ≤ lDE |Qt = 1,M t,A, CS
]
(40)
=2nlRH max
znt∈Znt
∑
j1,··· ,jt
t∏
i=1
P [Ji = ji|Qi = 1,Mi = mi,A, CS ]
1
{
t∑
i=1
d(Sni (Ji), z
n
i ) ≤ lDE
}
(41)
where step (a) is a union bound, and step (b) fol-
lows from that 1) by definition of typicality, the num-
ber of ”1” in Ql is at least l (1− δ) (1− n), and t ,
l (1− δ) (1− n), 2) without loss of generalization we as-
sume Qi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Now we derive the probability
P [Ji = ji|Qi = 1,Mi = mi]. For different i, (Ji,Mi, Qi) is
i.i.d., hence for simplicity, we use P [J = j|Q = 1,M = m] to
denote P [Ji = ji|Qi = 1,Mi = mi]. Moreover, for simplicity,
we also omit condition A, CS for each probability expression.
First we have
P [Sn = sn, J = j,Q = 1,M = m]
=P [Sn = sn, J = j,M = m,Sn ∈ T nδ , Sn ∈ CS ] (42)
=P [Sn = sn, Sn ∈ T nδ , Sn ∈ CS ]
× P [J = j|Sn = sn, Sn ∈ T nδ , Sn ∈ CS ]P [M = m|J = j] .
(43)
For first term of 43, we have
P [Sn = sn, Sn ∈ T nδ , Sn ∈ CS ]
=P [Sn = sn] 1 {sn ∈ T nδ , sn ∈ CS} (44)
and
2−n(H(S)+) ≤ P [Sn = sn] ≤ 2−n(H(S)−), ifsn ∈ T nδ
(45)
where (45) is the property of typicality [11]. For other terms
of 43, we have
P [J = j|Sn = sn, Sn ∈ T nδ , Sn ∈ CS ]
≥2−n(R−H(S)+)1 {Sn (j) = sn} (46)
P [J = j|Sn = sn, Sn ∈ T nδ , Sn ∈ CS ]
≤2−n(R−H(S)−)1 {Sn (j) = sn} (47)
and
P [M = m|J = j] = 2−nRK1 {mp = jp} (48)
where (46) and (47) follow from the encoding process and the
condition CS satisfying A4.
Therefore,
P [J = j|M = m,Q = 1]
=
∑
sn∈Sn P [Sn = sn, J = j,Q = 1,M = m]∑
j∈[2nR]
∑
sn∈Sn P [Sn = sn, J = j,Q = 1,M = m]
(49)
≤
∑
sn∈Sn 2
−n(H(S)−)1 {sn ∈ T nδ , sn ∈ CS} ...∑
j∈[2nR]
∑
sn∈Sn 2−n(H(S)+)1 {sn ∈ T nδ , sn ∈ CS} ...
2−n(R−H(S)−)1 {Sn (j) = sn} 2−nRK1 {mp = jp}
2−n(R−H(S)+)1 {Sn (j) = sn} 2−nRK1 {mp = jp} (50)
≤ 2
n41 {Sn (j) ∈ T nδ , Sn (j) ∈ CS} 1 {mp = jp}∑
j∈[2nR] 1 {Sn (j) ∈ T nδ , Sn (j) ∈ CS} 1 {mp = jp}
(51)
=
2n41 {Sn (j) ∈ T nδ } 1 {mp = jp}∑
j∈[2nR] 1 {Sn (j) ∈ T nδ } 1 {mp = jp}
(52)
≤ 2
n41 {Sn (j) ∈ T nδ } 1 {mp = jp}∑
js∈[2nRK ] 1 {Sn (mp, js) ∈ T nδ }
(53)
≤2
n41 {Sn (j) ∈ T nδ } 1 {mp = jp}
(1− ) 2nRK (54)
where (54) follows from the condition CS satisfying A3.
Combining (41) and (54), we have
P
[
min
znl∈cz(CS ,M lQl)
d(Snl, znl) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS
]
≤µ max
znt∈Znt
∑
js,1,··· ,js,t
t∏
i=1
1 {Sn (mp,i, js,i) ∈ T nδ }
1{
t∑
i=1
d(Sn(mp,i, js,i), z
n
i ) ≤ lDE} (55)
≤µ max
znt∈Znt
2nRK∑
js,1=1
2nRK∑
js,2=1
· · ·
2nRK∑
js,t=1
∑
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
t∏
i=1
1{d(Sn(mp,i, js,i), zni ) = Di, Sn(mp,i, js,i) ∈ T nδ }
(56)
≤µ
∑
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
η1η2 · · · ηt (57)
(a)
=µ2O(l logn) max
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
η1η2 · · · ηt (58)
where µ = 1
(1−)t 2
nlRH−nt(RK−4),
ηi , max
mp,i∈
[
2n(R−RK)
] max
zni ∈Zn
(59)
2nRK∑
js,i=1
1{d(Sn(mp,i, js,i), zni ) ≤ Di, Sn(mp,i, js,i) ∈ T nδ }
(60)
and step (a) follows from that the number of the distortion
incurred by n length block is at most polynomial in n, see
Appendix A.
Combining (34), (35), and (58), we have
(61) (at top of the next page), where µ2 =
τn (1− )t 2nt(RK−4)−nlRH−O(l logn).
Therefore, we only need to prove when CS = c make A2
hold, then there exists a large enough n (not dependent on l)
that makes the following hold for any l.
max
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
η1η2 · · · ηt ≤ µ2 (63)
Assume A2 holds, then we have
max
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
η1η2 · · · ηt
≤ max
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
t∏
i=1
2n([RK−R(Di)]
++) (64)
Hence we only need show
max
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
t∏
i=1
2n([RK−R(Di)]
++) ≤ µ2 (65)
Assume there are b of Di such that RK > R(Di) in t
subblocks, and λ , bt . Then we have
max
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
t∏
i=1
2n([RK−R(Di)]
++)
≤ max
λ,D1,D2,··· ,Dλt:
∑λt
i=1Di≤lDE
2tn2λtnRK2−n
∑λt
i=1 R(Di)
(66)
≤ max
λ,D:λtD≤lDE
2tn2λtn(RK−R(D)) (67)
= 2tn+maxλ,D:λtD≤lDE [λtn(RK−R(D))] (68)
For sufficiently n, all subexponential terms in µ2 can be
omitted, hence we only need show
2tn+maxλ,D:λtD≤lDE [λtn(RK−R(D))] ≤ 2nt(RK−4)−nlRH
i.e.,
RH ≤ 1
l
[
t (RK − 4)− t− max
λ,D:λtD≤lDE
[λt (RK −R(D))]
]
=
t
l
[
−5+ min
λ,D:λD≤ tlDE
[(1− λ)RK + λR(D)]
]
(69)
PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl max
Hcode∈Hl,RH−
P[d(Snl, Znl) ≤ DE ] > τn
]
≤ PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
[
max
cz(CS ,M lQl)
P
[
min
znl∈cz(CS ,M lQl)
d(Snl, znl) ≤ DE |M lQlA5ACS
]
|A5ACS
]
> τn|A
]
+ n
≤ PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
EM lQl
[
max
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
η1η2 · · · ηt|A5ACS
]
> µ2|A
]
+ n
= PCS
[
lim sup
l→∞
max
D1,D2,··· ,Dt:
∑t
i=1Di≤lDE
η1η2 · · · ηt > µ2|A
]
+ n (61)
For small enough δ,  and large enough n, we have
t
l
= (1− δ) (1− n)→ 1
Then (69) becomes
RH ≤ min
λ,D:λD≤DE
[(1− λ)RK + λR(D)]
This is just the condition of Theorem (2). Hence the achiev-
ability of Theorem 2 holds.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: According to definition of A2,
PCS
[A2] (70)
=PCS
 maxjp∈[2n(R−RK)] maxzn∈Zn ηCS ,D (zn, jp)
> 2n([RK−R(D)]
++),∃D ∈ Dn
 (71)
≤ |Zn| 2n(R−RK)+O(logn) max
jp∈
[
2n(R−RK)
] max
D∈Dn
max
zn∈Zn
PCS
[
ηCS ,D (z
n, jp) > 2
n([RK−R(D)]++)
]
(72)
where (72) follows from a union bound and the fact |Dn|
is polynomial in n, see Appendix A. Define ξjp,js,zn ,
1
{
d (Sn (jp, js) , z
n) ≤ D,Sn (jp, js) ∈ T nδ
}
, then
ηzn,CS(jp) =
∑2nRK
js=1
ξjp,js,zn . Given jp and z
n, ξjp,js,zn , js ∈[
2nRK
]
are i.i.d. random variables, with mean
ECSξjp,js,zn = P {d (Sn, zn) ≤ DE , Sn ∈ T nδ } (73)
If we can show that the probability in (72) decays doubly
exponentially fast with n, then the proof will be complete. To
that end, we first introduce the following lemmas.
Lemma 6. [6], [7] If Sn is i.i.d. according to PS , then for
any zn,
P[d(Sn, zn) ≤ D,Sn ∈ T nδ ] ≤ 2−n(R(D)−o(1)), (74)
where R(D)is the point-to-point rate-distortion function for
PS , and o(1) is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and n→∞ .
Lemma 7. [6], [7] If Xm is a sequence of i.i.d. Bern(p)
random variables, then
P
[ m∑
i=1
Xi > k
]
≤
(emp
k
)k
. (75)
From Lemma 6, we see that
ECSξjp,js,zn ≤ 2−n(R(D)−o(1)) (76)
Using the bound on E[ξjp,js,zn ], we can apply Lemma 7 to
the probability in (72) by identifying
m = 2nRK
p ≤ 2−n(R(D)−o(1))
k = 2n([RK−R(D)]
++).
(77)
This gives
P
[ 2nRK∑
j=1
ξjp,js,zn > 2
n([RK−R(D)]++)
]
≤ 2−nα2nβ , (78)
where
α = [RK −R(D)]+ − (RK −R(D)) + − o(1)
β = [RK −R(D)]+ + . (79)
For any fixed  and large enough n, both α and β are
positive and bounded away from zero, and (78) vanishes
doubly exponentially fast. Consequently, the expression in (72)
vanishes, completing the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: According to definition of A3,
PCS
[A3] (80)
= PCS
[
min
jp∈
[
2n(R−RK)
] γCS(jp) < (1− ) 2nRK
]
(81)
≤ 2n(R−RK) max
jp∈
[
2n(R−RK)
]PCS [γCS(jp) < (1− ) 2nRK ]
(82)
Define ζjp,js , 1 {Sn (jp, js) ∈ T nδ }, then γCS(jp) =∑2nRK
js=1
ζjp,js . Given jp , ζjp,js , js ∈
[
2nRK
]
are i.i.d. random
variables, with mean
ECSζjp,js (83)
= P {Sn (j) ∈ T nδ } (84)
≥ 1− 2 (85)
where (85) holds for any 2 > 0 and sufficiently large n, and
it follows from the typicality property. If we can show that the
probability in (82) decays doubly exponentially fast with n,
then the proof will be complete. To that end, we first introduce
the following lemma on Chernoff bound.
Lemma 8. [12] If Xm is a sequence of i.i.d. Bern(p) random
variables, then
P
[ m∑
i=1
Xi ≤ (1− δ)mp
]
≤ e− δ
2mp
2 , 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. (86)
By indentifying that
m = 2nRK (87)
p ≥ 1− 2 (88)
δ ≥ 1− 1− 
1− 2 (89)
and applying Lemma 8, we have
PCS
{
γCS(jp) < (1− ) 2nRK
} ≤ e− δ2mp2 ≤ e− δ2m(1−2)2
(90)
For fixed , if δ is small enough and n is large enough, then
2 <  and 2 < 1, which means that δ > 0 and 1 − 2 > 0.
Hence (90) vanishes doubly exponentially fast. This completes
the proof of Lemma 2.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: According to definition of A4,
PCS
[A4] (91)
= PCS
 maxsn∈T nδ φCS (sn) > 2n(R−H(S)+),
or min
sn∈T nδ
φCS (s
n) < 2n(R−H(S)−)
 (92)
≤ PCS
[
max
sn∈T nδ
φCS (s
n) > 2n(R−H(S)+)
]
+ PCS
[
min
sn∈T nδ
φCS (s
n) < 2n(R−H(S)−)
]
(93)
In the following, we prove that both terms of (93) vanish as
n→∞.
PCS
[
max
sn∈T nδ
φCS (s
n) > 2n(R−H(S)+)
]
≤ |T nδ | max
sn∈T nδ
PCS
[
φCS (s
n) > 2n(R−H(S)+)
]
(94)
Define ζj,sn , 1 {Sn (j) = sn}, then φCS (sn) =∑
j∈[2nR] ζj,sn . Given s
n ∈ T nδ , ζj,sn , j ∈
[
2nR
]
are i.i.d.
random variables, with mean
ECSζj,sn (95)
= P {Sn (j) = sn} (96)
≤ 2−n(H(S)−2(δ)) (97)
where 2 (δ) tends to zero as δ → 0, and (97) follows from the
typicality property [11]. If we can show that the probability in
(94) decays doubly exponentially fast with n, then the proof
will be complete.
By indentifying that
m = 2nR (98)
p ≤ 2−n(H(S)−2(δ)) (99)
k = 2n(R−H(S)+) (100)
and applying Lemma 7, we have
PCS
[
φCS (s
n) > 2n(R−H(S)+)
]
≤ 2−nα2nβ , (101)
where
α = − 2 (δ)
β = R−H (S) + . (102)
For fixed , if n is large enough and δ is small enough,
then 2 (δ) < , which means that α > 0 and β > 0. Hence
(101) vanishes doubly exponentially fast. This means that (94)
holds.
In the same way, by utilizing Lemma 8, we can prove that
for small enough δ, as n→∞,
PCS
[
min
sn∈T nδ
φCS (s
n) < 2n(R−H(S)−)
]
→ 0 (103)
Therefore, this completes the proof of Lemma 3.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof: According to definition of A1, we have
PSn [A1|CS ,A] (104)
= PSn [Sn ∈ T nδ , Sn ∈ CS |CS ,A] (105)
= PSn [Sn ∈ T nδ |CS ,A]PSn [Sn ∈ CS |Sn ∈ T nδ , CS ,A]
(106)
= PSn [Sn ∈ T nδ |CS ,A] (107)
= PSn [Sn ∈ T nδ ] (108)
where (108) follows from that if R ≥ H (S)+, Sn ∈ T nδ and
CS satisfying A4, then Sn ∈ CS . In addition, by law of large
numbers, we have PSn [Sn ∈ T nδ ]→ 1 as n→∞ [11].
